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Envious Ethnography and the Ethnography of Envy in Anthropology’s “Orient”: Towards 
A Theory of Envy 
 
Drawing on prevalent Euro-American folk models, extant theories of envy in the social sciences 
tend to reduce it to an emotion embodied in individual subjects, who are believed to envy those 
who have more and those who are hierarchically superordinate. Yet envy can also be viewed as a 
social, intersubjective phenomenon—one potentially incorporating humans and various other-
than-human entities into complex and unpredictable relationships involving occult phenomena 
like witchcraft and the evil eye as well as entire families, regions, and abstract identity categories 
of ethnicity, gender, and class. The tension between ethnographic accounts of envy in the Middle 
East and Middle Eastern accounts of envy provides an opportunity to explore the phenomenon of 
‘envying down’ and an underappreciated, recursive dimension of envy: envying the efficacy of 
other people’s envy. Envy is revealed to be reflexive, relational, and often institutionalized—
even within the institution of ethnography itself. 
 
 
While studies of envy in the social sciences customarily begin by bemoaning the lack of 
previous scholarly attention to the subject1, this is not completely fair. Ethnographers have 
arguably been producing a wealth of subtle accounts of envy since the nineteenth century. The 
problem is that the most sophisticated of these studies have gone largely unacknowledged and 
unappreciated as such, while the most straightforward attempts to investigate envy 
ethnographically tend to follow psychologists, economists, and philosophers in taking for 
granted a certain Euro-American folk model that treats envy as a purely subjective emotion. To 
their credit, even the most psychologizing ethnographic accounts of envy have always provided a 
window into its workings in the context of deeply routinized, long-term, face-to-face relations, 
often involving kinship (Foster 1965, 1972; Ghosh 1983; Lindholm 1982, 2008). Ethnographic 
accounts have also brilliantly catalogued the innumerable ways in which envy can involve 
various other-than-human entities, from occult phenomena like witchcraft and the evil eye to 
 
1 For some, like George Foster (1972), this seems to arise from a desire to justify one’s research by purporting to fill 
a “gap” of sorts. For others, though, like the more polemical Helmut Schoeck (1969), it is a result of a deliberate 
attempt to mould the social sciences in the image of left-wing politics by ignoring envy as a legitimate topic of 
study. A recent interdisciplinary volume about envy by Oxford University Press continued this tradition, bemoaning 
how little anthropologist have written so far on the topic (Smith 2008: 11-12).  
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entire families, regions, and abstract identity categories of ethnicity, gender, and class (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1999; Elyachar 2005; Evans-Pritchard 1935; Maloney 1976; Spooner 1970; West: 
2006; Westermarck 1926).  
Despite the many insights generated by these approaches, however, they often 
inadvertently naturalize a limiting Euro-American notion of envy. Studies that follow this Euro-
American folk model treat envy as an emotion and proceed to pursue a reductionist search for the 
abstract subjective quanta of envy. Thus envy comes to be theorized as a matter of being in the 
thrall of what the development anthropologist George Foster calls, “the image of the limited 
good” (1965:296; 1972:169; see also Lindholm 2008:233-238) or, alternately, envy is theorized 
as what the ethnographer (and now novelist) Amitav Ghosh terms a “contradiction” between “an 
asserted equality and objective conditions which make its realization impossible” (1983:222; see 
also Lindholm 1982:xxvii; Lindholm 2008:229-236). Both of these models accept that envy is 
best identified with what the accusation of envy claims to target: the bad feelings and resentment 
of the inferior regarding their own inferiority in relation to their social betters. Foster goes so far 
as to argue that, with few exceptions (like the “busy banker” and the “barefoot boy, fishing pole 
over his shoulder”), “one normally does not envy down” (1972: 171)2. It is as if the person who 
makes an accusation of envy (as Foster repeatedly does with reference to those he seeks to 
“develop”) is little more than an innocent bystander. 
 Yet it is not clear why ethnographers should take the Euro-American folk theory of envy 
at face value, all the more so given the way in which it is often couched in the idiom of 
accusation. In contrast, ethnographers do not usually take for granted that the essence of 
 
2 While Foster is dismissive of such scenarios in which people embodying competing social values might envy each 
other, the phenomenon deserves more attention: how might the wealthy merchant envy the ascetic renunciate? How 
might the dowdy householder envy their vivacious servants? 
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witchcraft lies in what people claim to be targeting when they make witchcraft accusations. For 
instance, E.E. Evans-Pritchard prefaced his pathbreaking study of Azande witchcraft beliefs by 
saying, “Witches, as the Azande conceive them, clearly cannot exist” (1935:18). To the contrary, 
counter-sorcery tends to so dominate the ostensible social activity around ‘sorcery’ accusations 
that sorcery and counter-sorcery are often treated as almost indistinguishable—by analysts and 
even practitioners themselves (West 2006). The same skepticism attaches to a number of other 
forms of social scapegoating as well. For example, Jean-Paul Sartre famously pointed out how 
ridiculous it would be to try and explain the calumnies of the anti-semite in terms of the “Jews” 
that anti-semitism holds responsible for the world’s problems ([1948]1995:69)—an observation 
that Frantz Fannon (among others) has extended to similarly quixotic attempts to define “race” as 
something inherent in “blacks” ([1952]1986:93). In Racecraft, Karen and Barbara Fields call this 
a “sleight of hand” that “transforms racism, something an aggressor does, into race, something 
the target is” (2012:17). Similarly, envy tends to emerge most visibly in the form of accusations 
that are often (but certainly not always) used by the socially dominant to essentialize envy as a 
quality of the weak and the marginal. As I have argued elsewhere, amidst enthusiasm for an 
‘affective turn’ (Hemmings 2005), it is worth being wary of the potential category error of 
confusing people’s actual feelings for ‘the politics of accusation’: moralizing discourses that 
attach ‘ugly emotions’ to stigmatized others (Hughes et al. 2019).   
To accept that accusations of envy are not necessarily innocent and that ethnographic 
studies of envy may be implicated in the very dynamics they seek to study creates a serious 
analytic impasse. While few would deny that the weak and the marginal may in fact experience 
precisely the sorts of envy that they are accused of harboring, an ethnographically rigorous 
approach cannot ignore its own role in the materialization and institutionalization of that envy. 
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This is all the more true when seeking to locate envy in the postcolonial world. The identification 
of envy with places like the Middle East is especially redolent of Orientalism, a term that has 
become deeply symptomatic in recent decades of struggles around the representation of various 
regional ethnographic traditions in anthropology. Most notorious perhaps was the thesis of 
Edward Said’s long-time intellectual antagonist, the Orientalist and later Neoconservative Bush 
administration adviser Bernard Lewis, who argued in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” that hatred of 
America in the region was rooted in envy. Indeed, with his mix of admiration and repulsion at 
the ability of “Islamic fundamentalism” to serve as a powerful check on Western domination by 
giving “aim and form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentments of the Muslim masses” 
(1990), Lewis arguably tips his hand. The public accusation of envy reveals previously 
submerged anxieties that other people’s envy might actually be effective in countering one’s 
attempts to maintain a “flexible positional superiority” (Said 1978:15-16).  
Anthropology’s explicit theoretical interest in envy lasted from the 1960s to the 1980s, 
arising from—but also running aground on—dynamics around the increasing reflexivity of 
anthropology as a discipline amidst a period of American imperial expansion and retrenchment. 
The more freely accusations of envy, resentment, and ressentiment around the politics of 
representation have flowed in the discipline, the more the empirical study of these phenomena 
has been muted. Despite Foster’s claim that, ‘one does not envy down,’ Foster’s own theoretical 
contributions to anthropology actually provide an ideal case study in how even the most 
empirically sound envy accusations can represent a form of ‘envying down’: in this case Foster’s 
envy of the efficacy of the peasantry’s envy in frustrating the work of development. And like 
other manifestations of envy, ‘envying down’ is not merely symptomatic of preexisting invidious 
emotions but also further reifies relationships of envy—all the while resisting explicit 
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recognition. This fraught intellectual history itself typifies the self-referential and self-reinforcing 
yet also self-effacing dimensions of envy.  
Building on Said’s critiques of Orientalist “imaginative geographies” of social difference 
(Said 1978), anthropologists like Lila Abu Lughod (1989) and Arjun Appadurai (1986) 
developed the concept of the “prestige zone” to highlight the slippage through which agendas 
within the ethnographic literature can efface the concerns of ethnographic interlocutors. In 
taking the Middle East (or any other place) as a potentially privileged site for ethnographic 
engagement with the phenomenon of envy (or any other topic), ethnographers inevitably run 
precisely this risk. Envy and its various institutional elaborations transcend the region in 
important ways, so why connect them to the Middle East at all if doing so risks making the 
region a prestige zone for stigmatized social phenomena like envy? Because it is precisely the 
process of theoretical stigmatization and avoidance that is key to understanding envy’s workings. 
In a recent follow-up to Abu Lughod’s piece, Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar fret that there has 
been an over-correction—to the point where more urban, cosmopolitan areas and topics are now 
studied to the exclusion of the sort of more ‘exotic’ material that dominated an older generation 
of scholarship (2012:537-540). The increasing discomfort among ethnographers with the 
challenge of identifying phenomena like envy in the contemporary Middle East area studies 
literature comes to offer a useful model for the difficulty of locating envy in the world more 
generally.  
Envy’s peculiar, fundamentally relational character will emerge with the interplay 
between the ethnographic literature on the Middle East and the ethnographic encounter itself 
providing the empirical raw material for analysis. This focus on the ethnographic literature’s 
relationship to the ethnographic encounter accentuates the ways in which envy entails multiple 
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self-referential layers and scales, which is key to its ability to leverage people’s intersubjective 
entanglements to manifest itself as an objective social force. As the literary theorist Sianne Ngai 
has perceptively noted, envy is one of those “ugly feelings” that “contains a model of the 
problem that defines it” because envy is part and parcel of a set of anxieties that problematize the 
objectivity of the social inequality that is their own putative object (2005:21). However, engaging 
with a wider ethnographic archive will challenge Ngai’s assertion that, “after [envy] enters a 
public domain of signification it will always seem unjustified and critically effete” as it is 
“reduced to signifying a static subjective trait: the ‘lack’ or ‘deficiency’ of the person who 
envies” (ibid).  
In contrast, Middle Eastern ethnography will afford a view of social worlds in which 
envy is accorded far more power than the Euro-American folk model will countenance. Unlike  
attempts to mobilize “emotions” to construct artificial boundaries around persons as individuals, 
social institutions like the evil eye, witchcraft, honor, and hospitality reveal envy to be not so 
much a “lack” or something “effete” in need of critical recuperation but rather a potent social 
force in its own right. Most intriguing for an ethnographer like myself is the possibility that 
Middle Eastern ideas of envy could overcome the theoretical cul-de-sac of the “prestige zone” as 
critiqued by Appadurai and Abu Lughod through what Marilyn Strathern calls “negative 
strategies.” This would involve a sort of “cathexis” or negative investment that emerges from, 
“moments when the invention of concepts in local ethnographic contexts rearranges conceived 
notions, thus bouncing back off assumptions which inform metropolitan theory… [giving] way 
to a reflexive move that reveals these ideas as projections of metropolitan thinking itself” 
(Strathern 1990:205). Amidst calls to decolonize the discipline, it is this potential ability of 
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Middle Eastern conceptions of envy to reconfigure metropolitan thinking about the latent role of 
envy within ethnographic description itself that makes such an investigation worth the risks. 
This article begins by focusing on how my own experiences as an ethnographer studying 
the Middle East came to transform my understandings of envy: how I came to recognize envy 
where I had never seen it before and how I came to fear its malign, often occult effects. I focus in 
particular on my (often unsuccessful) attempts to use and understand the phrase mashallah, 
which by various accounts can be seen as a verbal incantation, a prayer, and a form of indirect 
speech indexing relations of envy. In the next section, I will show how the difficulties that 
ethnographers (like all social actors) experience when locating and naming envy are recursively 
present within the discipline of anthropology’s historically fraught attempts to locate envy 
geographically and sociologically. In the final section of the paper, I show how discussion of 
envy in Middle Eastern ethnography came to be short-circuited as ethnographers increasingly 
worked to sublimate envy’s negativity and transform their accounts of it into accounts of more 
pro-social phenomena, like generosity, egalitarianism, and grace. In the conclusion, I argue that 
this unwillingness to fully engage with envy has left ethnographers (and scholarship more 
generally) bereft of rigorous models of envy that can help make sense of a range of predicaments 
grounded in this contemporary era’s increasingly rancorous forms of inequality.  
Mashallah: Finding Envy in the Middle East 
Mashallah is a common Arabic-Islamicate phrase that can be translated as ‘God has 
willed it’ or ‘God be pleased.’ The phrase is a prevalent feature of the visual landscape, adorning 
thresholds (figure 1) and cars (figure 2) among other things. It is used by Arab Christians as well, 
and its range extends far beyond the Arabic-speaking world thanks to the spread of Islam. 
Mashallah was one of the first phrases I learned when I began living with Arabic speakers, but 
 8 
beyond understanding that it offered protection from the evil eye, learning to appreciate the 
wisdom behind the phrase (like most ethnographic insights) ultimately required being disabused 
of a host of unexamined assumptions through patient tutelage. Behind the phrase lay an 
important set of metaphysical and moral assumptions that I initially found baffling. Here I was, 
coming from a social milieu in the US where “I envy you” is a compliment, where everything is 
supposed to be fascinating, originally from the Latin fascinatio: to bewitch, to cast the evil eye. I 
found I was consistently complimenting people too freely and, in trying to be agreeable, making 
people deeply uncomfortable. Even more awkwardly, I found that when I complimented people’s 
possessions, they would try to force me to take them. As I became more adept linguistically and 
culturally, I continually had to recalculate how to interweave my ongoing need to flatter people 
with the need to deny invidious intent. Part of that was constantly wondering why people around 
me were repeating the phrase Mashallah—and whether I should too. The implication here was 
that people needed protection from envy because it had the ability to afflict others in very 
concrete ways—although the remarkable polysemy of the phrase was a reflection of wide-
ranging differences of opinion about just what the nature of those powers might be. Nonetheless 
these different uses of Mashallah all shared a tendency to see envy as fundamentally social and 
intersubjective and, moreover, entangled with institutions, communities, and other collectivities 
as much as individual human subjects. 
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For instance, many ethnographers will be familiar with the experience of having their 
belongings meticulously inspected by friends and relative strangers alike during fieldwork, 
especially when the ethnographer has privileged access to money and goods—as is often the 
case3. This facet of global inequality is so widespread that I was fully accustomed to this 
commonplace ritual when a host’s teenaged son and his friend stopped by my apartment. 
Predictably, the latter went straight for the electronics that, despite being selected for their 
antiquity and ugliness, were still nicer than anything he owned. Each one elicited a string of 
mischievous mashallahs and questions about how much it cost and whether or not I would be 
interested in selling it. Suffice it to say that my attempts at hospitality that day were far from 
successful. I was quickly sidetracked into deflecting attempts to purchase my possessions, and I 
came across as a seasoned tightwad—an experience, again, that many anthropologists will 
recognize. Sadly, I never got them to sit down for tea. Eventually my host’s son ushered his 
 
3 Discussion of the wealth gap in “reflexive” treatments of ethnography is ubiquitous, but they rarely theorize envy, 
particularly the ethnographer’s discomfort at the possible envy of their interlocutors (but see Bleek 1979). 
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friend out the door, reproaching him for ‘annoying’ me, although it was probably my own 
ineptitude that made the situation unpleasant. 
While it is impossible for me to know for sure what my would-be guests intended by their 
words, I want to emphasize here how even my own psychology remains somewhat inaccessible, 
buried beneath layers of bad faith and self-serving rationalizations. While the situation is 
redolent of a certain pattern Nietzchean resentment and ressentiment, relating those terms to 
specific psychological states and social roles has proven to be contentious and politicized. On the 
one hand, Weber took up the concept of ressentiment to argue that Abrahamic monotheism lends 
itself well to a “theodicy of the disprivileged,” and an expectation that “the unequal distribution 
of mundane goods” will eventually be set right by “God’s wrath” (1978:494). Perhaps it was just 
such a theodicy that lay at the heart of such mashallahs—and hence shaped my own defensive 
reaction to them. Yet on the other hand, Frederick Jameson has argued that such ideas about 
ressentiment might in fact be little more than a bourgeois fantasy, a projection of the elite’s 
discomfort at “seemingly gratuitous lower-class agitation” (1981:202). In other words, I might be 
the only resentful one here—and I might primarily be resenting my own fantasy projection of my 
guests’ ressentiment. Jameson argues that theories of ressentiment will have an “unavoidably 
autoreferential structure” insofar as they themselves, “will always be… the expression and the 
production of ressentiment” (ibid: 202). However, from an ethnographic perspective, it is worth 
resisting the analytic closure that comes with assuming resentment and ressentiment are limited 
to the superordinate because it ignores how elite envy might be the product of the well-earned 
and socially efficacious envy of the subordinate4. In the preceding case, there is even the 
 
4 Didier Fassin attempts a related solution to the problem when he effectively defines the subordinate’s emotional 
state as ressentiment and the superordinate’s emotional state as resentment. While denying accusations that he is 
normativizing the two states and lionizing ressentiment, he coyly accepts that he does intend a “political moral” 
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possibility that the socially inept ethnographer was largely a bystander projecting his own 
insecurities onto an unrelated circuit of resentment and ressentiment involving his host’s son and 
a more disadvantaged friend. These are not mutually exclusive options, after all. 
 
The ambiguity of the phrase mashallah is so marked that a recent study of the use of the 
phrase carried out by a team of researchers from Jordan University of Science and Technology 
argues that the phrase is largely devoid of semantic content, emphasizing instead its pragmatics. 
Drawing on a large sample of examples of the use of mashallah by Jordanian Arabic speakers, 
the researchers found that its pragmatics allowed it to be deployed as “an invocation, a 
compliment, an expression of gladness, an expression of modesty, a marker of sarcasm, and as a 
conversational backchannel.” They conclude that, “this formula serves as a membership marker 
whose use marks the speaker as a social insider who avoids acting in a way that would invite the 
‘evil eye’” (Migdadi et al. 2010:480). This pervasive use of indirect speech to index the 
 
(Fassin 2013: 265). Yet this seems to assume even more about subjective mental states on the basis of even thinner 
sociological grounds than Jameson’s approach. 
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existence of the evil eye may explain why the predominant conceit about the evil eye is that it is 
a sort of conspiracy of silence—even among those who are supposed to study such things. To 
quote Brian Spooner, the evil eye is “a phenomenon familiar to all, but apparently as little 
described by ethnographers as it is discussed by those who fear it” (1970:311).  
Yet despite being shrouded in bad faith, self-deception, autoreferentiality, irony, and 
implicature, there are moments when envy and its relationship to mashallah are subject to direct 
exegesis. One such commentary was presented to me, when a friend’s toddler jumped up into my 
lap. As potent symbols of fertility and potentiality, small children might serve as the object of 
envy par excellence in many rural communities. I smiled and said “mashallah” and mentioned 
how cute she was. When she jumped down, she waddled away, tripped, fell flat on her face, and 
began to cry. Her uncle began explaining to me didactically that it is important to say 
“mashallah” in situations like this to protect children from “the eye of envy” (‘ayn al-ḥasad). Her 
grandfather, however, dismissed the implicit accusation, pointing out to his nephew that I had 
very clearly said “mashallah” right before the accident, “so it must have been you [the uncle] 
who struck her [with the evil eye].”  
According to local beliefs about the evil eye, any one of us could have been guilty of 
causing her to fall down—and we might not even know it. When I asked people in rural areas 
about envy or ḥasad in the abstract (and only in the abstract) people were strikingly forthcoming 
given the topic’s treatment in the literature. Their accounts were also highly formulaic. It was a 
powerful force that came from the eye, usually unconsciously. The ḥasad of ‘the people’ caused 
children to fall ill. It made your tent blow over in the night. It made your chandelier fall on the 
floor and shatter. “Ḥasad is in the Qur’an,” they would say. “You cannot be a Muslim if you 
don’t believe in ḥasad,” the more enthusiastic would allege. In a way highly reminiscent of 
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Evans-Pritchard’s (1935) account of Azande witchcraft beliefs, the evil eye offers itself as a 
whole theory of causality that centers human relationships of envy and inequality as prime 
movers in the workings of the world.  
There are other ways of thinking about ḥasad, though. Especially among urbanites and 
the well-educated, alternative readings of the concept sought to temper its cosmological 
significance much as the Quran itself does: by subsuming it within a broader monotheistic, 
monocausal framework. The result is a model of envy not unlike the one I brought with me to 
rural Jordan, primarily subjectivist and mentalist. In fact, Jordanian city-folk who adopted this 
model were liable to be as flummoxed by village conceptions of envy as I initially was. Surat Al-
Falaq (The Daybreak), the one Quranic verse to mention ḥasad and itself a widely respected 
cure for ḥasad that can also be seen in the background of figure 1, reads: 
Say, ‘I seek refuge in the lord of daybreak,  
from the evil of that which He created,  
and from the evil of the darkness when it settles,  
and from the evil of the blowers on knots [sorcerers],  
and from the envier when he envies’  
 
Compared to Azande witchcraft beliefs, which attribute almost all misfortune to human envy, 
human envy and human agency here cannot cause much at all without God’s will. Strikingly, this 
verse posits God as both the ultimate source of envy and sorcery (‘that which He created’) and 
the ‘refuge’ from those very creations. This fatalist perspective on causality can be pushed 
further: in the Ash‘arite cosmology of the Sunni revival (Harman 2011), an all-powerful God 
recreates the entire universe from moment to moment. From this occasionalist perspective, even 
the most seemingly entrenched form of hierarchy is merely a form of mercy, one of the many 
regularities in the universe that God perpetuates, such that humans may go about their affairs 
with a modicum of certainty and normalcy. This is redolent of the other side of Weber’s reading 
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of the Abrahamic tradition: a reading that emphasizes a theodicy of the privileged coexisting 
alongside the theodicy of the disprivileged, insisting against protests to the contrary that 
privileges must be accepted as divinely ordained (1978:494).  
 
Mashallah figures envy as a robust, objective, contagious, and fundamentally social 
phenomenon. The phrase might often be intended to deflect envy by asserting that everything 
exists, in hierarchy or otherwise, in accordance with a single, coherent, divinely-inspired plan. 
Yet envy and the use of the phrase mashallah are also deeply associated with a profound fear of 
occult, leveling powers that might outstrip the social order’s ability to contain them—thus the 
insistent appeal to a God who might or might not act to save those in fear of envy. In extreme 
cases, the fear of envy might even incite people to turn away from God and instead embrace the 
very occult practitioners (the sorcerers or ‘blowers on knots’) that the Quran warns against (see 
the amulets in Figure 3). Mashallah’s vulnerability to sarcasm also works against the idea that it 
is a bulwark of a fixed social order. Above all, these examples force us to consider who is really 
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the envious one here, me or my interlocutors—and which of my interlocutors and when? As the 
next section will illustrate, this problem—far from being unique to the individual ethnographic 
encounter—has long bedeviled the discipline of anthropology’s attempts to locate, name, and 
investigate envy as a social phenomenon.  
Naming Envy in the Ethnographic Literature 
Much of the impetus for the theorization of envy in anthropology can be attributed to 
George Foster’s notion of the “image of the limited good” (1965). Foster was interested in the 
anthropology of development and applied anthropology, building on earlier work in peasant 
studies on economic leveling and the idea of the “culture of poverty” that would later become so 
central to neoconservative and neoliberal attacks on the welfare state. This era of research 
combined a heavy dose of anti-communist Cold War developmentalist ideology, with its belief in 
a unilineal evolutionary teleology of ‘progress’ on the model of the capitalist “West” and married 
it to the then state-of-the-art in diffusionist and structural-functionalist approaches. The result 
was a notion that envy moved through its own evolutionary stages, developing from witchcraft 
beliefs into the evil eye complex and finally being truly domesticated by the great literate 
religious traditions, especially Christianity. The project combined salvage ethnography with a 
sublimated fear of the world’s dispossessed, and arose chiefly in American anthropology at a 
moment of profound optimism about humanity and technological progress before dissipating as 
that optimism began to sour.  
In “Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good” (1965), Foster laid out the first 
programmatic statement on the need to approach envy as an ethnographic problem, using the 
putative disjuncture between “modern” and “peasant” notions of envy as the starting point for his 
analysis. In doing so, he moved envy out of the realm of the purely psychological in ways that 
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demanded either a culturalist or a sociological account. While Foster believed that this “image of 
the limited good” was outdated under capitalist modernity, he was vociferous in explaining why 
it was, historically, that peasants were “rational” to think that their neighbor’s advantage could 
only come at their own expense. Foster asserted that in peasant communities, “all of the desired 
things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and 
status, power and influence, safety and security, exist in finite quantity and are always in short 
supply” (1965:296). He argued that, “the primary task in development… [is] to try to change the 
peasants' view of his social and economic universe, away from an Image of Limited Good 
toward that of expanding opportunity in an open system, so that he can feel safe in displaying 
initiative.” Optimistically, he continued, “This is, of course, what is happening in the world 
today. Those who have known peasant villages over a period of years have seen how the old 
sanctions begin to lose their power. Local entrepreneurs arise in response to the increasing 
opportunities of expanding national economies, and emulative urges, with the city as the model, 
appear among these people” (Foster 1965: 310). 
More famous than such ethnographic works (and much more widely cited), however, was 
the magnum opus of the German sociologist Helmut Schoeck (1969), the fervently anti-
communist would-be doyen of envy studies. Schoeck drew on the work of Foster and other 
anthropologists (mostly people working on sorcery and the evil eye) to argue that envy was the 
result of an inability to accept the legitimacy of naturally occurring hierarchies in ability and 
deservingness. Following Weber, he argued that there was something specific about European 
Christianity that had allowed it to transcend the limitations human envy and ressentiment 
imposed on civilizational development. He declared, “In the West, the historical achievement of 
this Christian ethic is to have encouraged and protected, if not to have been actually responsible 
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for the extent of, the exercise of human creative powers through the control of envy” (Schoeck 
1969: 160). Distancing themselves from such conservative appropriations of their work, 
anthropologists would increasingly efface the barely disguised condescension of their initial 
publications, with Foster himself coming to strenuously argue that envy was an important—but 
repressed—aspect of American society itself (1972:166-167). Yet no matter how self-reflexive 
he became, despite writing at the height of the civil rights movement, Foster never connected his 
idea of the ‘image of the limited good’ to the often-violent attempts of white Americans to 
protect their unequal access to the benefits of American citizenship—at home or in neighboring 
Mexico where he did his fieldwork. Soon though, the whole notion of the ‘image of the limited 
good’ would be largely discarded in favor of a model of people jostling for advantage within a 
pre-given social hierarchy (Ghosh 1983; Lindholm 1982). It was at this point that the study of 
envy petered out, with its initial, culturalist impetus expended and participants seeing little 
reason to carry it forward.  
Yet for a brief moment, there were efforts to synthesize a generalized, cross-cultural 
approach to envy. The best exemplar of this approach is Clarence Maloney’s 1976 edited volume 
on the evil eye. John Roberts’ contribution draws on a quantitative analysis of Murdock’s 
Human Relations Area Files to plot the regional distribution of evil eye beliefs amongst 186 
distinct human “cultures.” Noting high correlations between the evil eye and things like plough 
agriculture, the consumption of milk products, and premodern urbanization, he speculated that 
the belief arose somewhere in the Near East, from whence it spread outwards to South Asia, 
Northern Africa, the Mediterranean, and eventually Latin America. Writing in the conclusion to 
that volume, Garrison and Arsenberg asserted that invidia—envy—and evil eye beliefs “are 
emergents from behavioral processes involved in the more general categories of rivalry, 
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cooperation, and competition in the context of dominance and submission mediated by patronage 
in stratified, but not yet bureaucratized societies.” As in the case of witchcraft, which they saw as 
the evil eye’s “equivalent in egalitarian and ranked societies,” they perceived the evil eye’s 
persistence in the “lower strata of the modern nation state” (Maloney 1976:326) as a vestigial 
link to a bygone era. Without endorsing the implicit unilineal evolutionary underpinnings of this 
work (‘not yet bureaucratized’), it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that some highly 
salient points about the distribution and manifestation of the phenomenon of the evil eye were 
well documented at the time. Chief among these were the concentration of evil eye beliefs in 
Western Asia and the Mediterranean basin, emanating outwards, and its correlation with 
particular sorts of social organization that combine entrenched inequalities with weak centralized 
control.   
Anthropological theory’s discovery of envy came late and initially depended 
(predictably) on the idea that envy was primarily a problem for other people and other societies. 
Even in his later work Foster argued, “envy behavior is particularly apparent” in “societies 
characterized by absolute shortages of the resources necessary for physical survival” (1972:168) 
while emphasizing that envy going forward would be increasingly a matter of misperception: the 
image of the limited good. The peasants just had to stop resisting the ministrations of Western 
development anthropologists and embrace the emerging global capitalist economy. Yet for all of 
his desire to vindicate the rationality of his research subjects and uplift them through greater 
integration within national economies, no less a famously jaundiced ethnographic observer than 
Oscar Lewis himself felt forced to title his own review of Foster’s early work, “Some of My Best 
Friends Are Peasants” (1960). Chastened, perhaps, Foster would slowly abandon many of the 
hallmarks of this early work, increasingly vociferous in his position that envy was a human 
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universal and going so far as to argue that Americans could not understand envy without 
understanding how they systematically minimized the importance of envy within their own 
society (1972:166)—an idea at the heart of the remainder of this article.  
Sadly, with the end of serious space exploration and the rise of the environmental 
movement, peak oil, and increasing levels of inequality, it is Foster’s optimistic image of the 
unlimited good that now seems outmoded and fanciful. The flurry of interest in envy that Foster 
inspired with his idea of the ‘image of the limited good’ came at a time when it was widely 
accepted that consistent, exponential economic growth was not only possible, but feasible. As the 
historian Timothy Mitchell shows in his history of the Middle Eastern oil industry, Carbon 
Democracy, this was in large part dependent on a belief that humans were in possession of 
unlimited energy resources (2011:109-143). The oil crisis of 1973-1974 and the rise of the 
environmental movement may not have played a direct role in anthropological debates about 
envy and the ‘limited good’, but it book-ends a period of optimism in which the finitude of 
natural resources and the zero-sum nature of sociality were not taken for granted. The following 
section will show how the subsequent development of anthropological work on envy and its 
many institutional forms has gone underground amidst something of a backlash that mirrors the 
same sorts of avoidance strategies deployed by individual social actors when confronted with 
envy. 
Writing Envy: Egalitarianism, Hospitality, and the Grace of God 
 There is often a duality to the ethnographic self-conception, mixing extreme grandiosity 
with self-loathing. Ethnographers may see themselves as protecting the weak or as handmaidens 
of colonialism; detached scientific geniuses with a ‘bird’s eye view’ or vulnerable individuals 
toiling away in the empirical muck. The experience of ethnography also tends to involve 
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extremes: on the one hand, extreme privileges of mobility, externality to regular social norms, 
and often wealth and educational advantages. On the other hand, ethnographers tend to be 
extremely vulnerable, at the mercy of their hosts and – if they are anything like me in the 
preceding vignettes – in possession of a seemingly child-like understanding of their surroundings 
at times. So it should come as little surprise that, when it comes to academic fashions in the 
ethnographic representation of world regions, there is also a tendency to swing from extremes. 
The representation of envy in Middle Eastern ethnography has become attenuated in recent 
decades as increasing attention has been drawn to how ethnographic fixations reveal the desires 
and neuroses of the ethnographers who pursue them.  
Perhaps nowhere is this rediscovered reticence around envy clearer than in the backlash 
against the blithe imputations of development anthropologists like Foster that the root of envy 
lay in the resentments of the world’s poor. In their own ways, and despite working in apparent 
isolation at fieldsites on three separate continents, the anthropologists Amitav Ghosh, Charles 
Lindholm, and Julian Pitt-Rivers all revised Foster’s model along remarkably similar lines on the 
basis of fieldwork carried out among the Egyptian, Pakistani, and Andalusian peasantry 
respectively. This involved applying the segmentary kinship model that Evans-Pritchard (1969) 
developed while working with the nomadic pastoralist Nuer to sedentary peasants organized 
along similar kinship lines but seemingly locked into Foster’s zero-sum intra- and inter-
household struggle for limited resources, especially land. In each case, envy was transformed 
into a struggle for status that finds its fullest expression in the more pro-social institutions of 
honor, hospitality, egalitarianism and, ultimately, religious devotion. In the process, envy’s 
negativity undergoes a process of profound sublimation.  
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In Generosity and Jealousy (1982), Lindholm characterizes the Swat Pukhtun as defined 
by what he calls (after Evans-Pritchard), “an acephalous patrilineal segmentary system,” which 
he defines using the proverb, “I against my brother, my brother and I against my [patrilineal] 
cousin, my brother and my [patrilineal] cousin and I against the world” (1982:xxvi-xxvii). A 
drive for self-aggrandizement must here be balanced against the need to seek out allies. Yet those 
allies (here defined almost exclusively in terms of male kinship) simultaneously struggle for 
control of the very patrimony that they must nonetheless work together to protect from outsiders. 
Lindholm notes how this is very much caught up with a “contradiction between an ideology of 
equality and a reality of class distinction” (1982:xxvii). In avoiding downward social mobility, it 
often pays to prey on brothers and cousins rather than total strangers.  
Yet ultimately, this is of secondary interest to Lindholm’s key focus: explaining Pukhtun 
hospitality. Here, he sees a key linkage: “The whole structure of Swati society, it seems, presses 
against demonstrations of affection and attachment, so these emotional relations find their 
release in hospitality and the dream of a friend.” As he reasons, “if the culture does not allow 
easy expression of certain inherent and necessary emotions then they must be expressed in ritual 
and ideology” (Lindholm 1982:xxxi). With more modesty and self-awareness than many, 
Lindholm relates his own field research experience to the more general set of Pukhtun social 
values around friendship and honor: 
“I was a lone, rather alienated young man wandering across Asia. Zaman’s offer 
of friendship, his sincerity and warmth, coupled with the intriguing exoticism and 
masculine quality of Pukhtun life drew me into a very intense emotional 
experience. At the time, I was willing to accept Zaman’s word on everything and 
trust him completely; nor was I ever disappointed in my trust. In a sense, he and I 
were perfectly complementary because I had made myself an empty canvas where 
his generosity and honor could be portrayed” (Lindholm 1982:246). 
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The condition of possibility for Lindholm’s fieldwork was precisely his ability as the 
ethnographer to be the rare social actor who is peculiarly qualified to fulfill the key 
characteristics of a Pukhtun friend, “strangeness, equality without rivalry, and an absence of 
competing interests” (Lindholm 1982:245). This is what allows the ethnographer (especially the 
white, male ethnographer) to accept the hospitality of his interlocutor and become, ‘an empty 
canvas where his generosity and honor could be portrayed.’  
Writing a year later but without making reference to Lindholm’s work, Ghosh’s 1983 
critique of Foster’s work drew on fieldwork in the rural Egyptian village of “Naçaawy” to 
describe a strikingly similar prototypical village community where the image of the limited good 
would also seem to hold in the most archetypal of configurations. This was a village where both 
land and water were finite resources and everyone knew everyone else’s precise status (although 
livestock offered a path for upward mobility and notable focal point for envy accusations). 
Ghosh argues that envy arises because the village’s “egalitarian ethos” runs up against a pattern 
of accumulation based on individual households. He writes, “The essence of the contradiction is 
property. Envy in Naçaawy takes the form it does because the ownership of productive resources 
is vested in households and because the subdivision of property turns brothers and cousins into 
competitors in production” (Ghosh 1983:222). Ghosh’s thick description is perhaps more useful 
than his more abstract formulations, though—especially his focus on brothers and his meticulous 
documentation of the phenomenon of “envying down.” He describes envy in the context of 
intimate, long-term relations, which can exhibit idiosyncratic characteristics. As Ghosh points 
out: the people most likely to be envious tend to be those closest not just in terms of social 
hierarchy but also as in terms of spatial proximity and kinship: neighbors and brothers (the better 
to see what one is envying perhaps).  
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Ghosh’s description of local understandings of envy are worth quoting at length because 
of the ways in which they challenge the explanation of envy provided by Foster’s “image of the 
limited good”—as well as Ghosh’s own model of envy as a psychological response to the 
contradiction between egalitarian values and the realities of inequality inherent in a householding 
system. In contrast: 
“Villagers say it is always the rich man (ilghani) who envies the poor man 
(ilfagiir)… It is said that to become rich a man must have cunning… he has to 
save money for a long time, during which he must deny himself and his family 
everything that people in the village enjoy. He becomes a miser (baxiil); when he 
sees a stranger pass his doorway he is never heard to shout, ‘please come in’ 
(itfaḍḍal), nor does he serve tea or food to guests. Thus as a man grows rich his 
personality changes… and he comes to be filled with hatred and resentment 
against everyone around him… If envy arises whenever a household thinks it has 
a means of changing its position within the determinate set of relations within the 
village, it is the well-to-do of the village who stand as the defenders of the 
determinacy of those relations and, so, as the most likely agents of envy” (Ghosh 
1983:221). 
 
Considering Foster’s contention about the implausibility of envying down, Ghosh simply 
responds, “none of this is true of Naçaawy” (1983:218).  
It is not just Naçaawy, though. Ghosh’s description works quite well as an alternative 
telling of my own abortive attempts at hospitality and agreeability in the opening vignettes5. Or 
compare Ghosh’s description with the ninth-century classical Arab essayist Al-Jahiz’s satirical 
portrayal of the miserliness of Persian Khurāsāni immigrants in The Book of Misers, like the 
following man who makes the mistake of inviting an Arab passerby to join him for lunch. When 
the Arab accepts his invitation, the man is at first confused and then alarmed, finally berating the 
credulous would-be guest: 
 
5  Michael Gilsenan also flags this sort of envying down as an “important discursive theme” in village narratives of 
upward social mobility in Lebanon, “dogging any successful man in the village and acting to diminish his claims to 
excellence” (1996:208). Lindholm too discusses envying down but, not dismissing it as mere psychological 
projection (2008:239), he comes close—despite offering compelling evidence that it is in fact the honor-obsessed 
elite of the Swat Pukhtun who hosted him who envy the most.  
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“Confound you… Had I suspected you to be so stupid as that, I wouldn’t have 
returned your greeting. The etiquette we observe under such circumstances as 
these, is… that I speak first and say “Come over here,” and you reply with the 
words, “Good appetite! In this way, words will be given for words—but action in 
return for words and eating in return for speech is not right at all, and this would 
involve me in an excess of expenditure” (Al-Jahiz 1997:21).  
 
This intense, resentful conviction that one is the only person in the world encumbered by a sense 
of fair play is at the heart of Al-Jahiz’s etiology of bukhul—which while often translated as 
miserliness or avarice also captures a common species of envying down, a short step away from 
outright envying poorer people’s envy. Ghosh is at his best when he highlights this ability of the 
rich to exceed the poor in their envy, challenging the degree to which envy is about finite 
resources and suggesting that it has more to do with keeping others down than satiating one’s 
own needs and desires (1983:218)—although at times this seems to be at odds with his emphasis 
on the village’s supposedly egalitarian ideology.  
A further downside to reducing envy to a matter of jockeying for position within a single 
hierarchy, though, is that it leaves no room for the exploration of alternative ways of parsing 
difference and imagining hierarchy—ways that reveal the instability of the social order itself. 
Having found the abstract, subjective quanta of envy in bad feelings about inequality, envy 
comes to seem downright banal. Ghosh’s focus on brothers and neighbors, though, brings to 
mind the narcissism of small differences. Brothers are archetypes of jealousy par excellence: in 
the Abrahamic cosmology the first brothers Cain and Abel represent the first murder. As Ghosh 
notes, “these relations involve the greatest number of mutual obligations, the closest 
associations, and the greatest expectations of equality” (1983:222). The list of potential catalysts 
for conflict is endless, the way that these idiosyncratic catalysts impinge on the social elaboration 
of envy is complex, and their ability to upend and challenge established status hierarchies needs 
to be kept in mind. Ghosh’s emphasis on the villagers’ plucky egalitarianism makes them 
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eminently relatable and his emphasis on the role of a political economy of peasant householding 
avoids essentialism. Yet his theory of envy is far more concerned with figuring out how his 
readers and his interlocutors in Naçaawy envy in the same ways than it is in figuring out why 
they envy in their own unique ways. In Ghosh’s hands, envy undergoes a process of sublimation, 
losing its threatening, negative valence and emerging as a familiar, positive, pro-social impetus: 
egalitarianism. 
This recourse to a thwarted egalitarianism as an explanatory mechanism may not be as 
innocent as it might first appear, though—even if it does create a framework for understanding 
envy as a shared condition of those being described as well as the anthropologist and their 
readership. Indeed, there are grounds for suspicion. Commenting on anthropological admiration 
for pastoral nomads’ egalitarianism, Abu Lughod suggests in “Zones of theory” that, “a 
fascination with the freedom of pastoral nomads is in part a rhetorical assertion of the 
anthropologists’ freedom from the projects of domination in which they participate, either 
directly or indirectly” (1989:286-287). She believes that this can help understand why, 
“segmentation may seem to be the only issue in the anthropology of the Arab world that relates 
to a classical anthropological debate actually transcending the region” (Abu Lughod 1989:285): 
“In many cultures, including several Western ones, agonistic encounters are 
emblems of virility. A certain admiration tinges descriptions of the fierce 
independence attributed to those in segmentary societies, including Middle 
Eastern tribesmen. These are real men, freed from the emasculating authority of 
the state and polite society. Furthermore, for many writers, these tribesmen 
represent romantic political ideals of freedom from authority and loyalty to 
democracy” (Abu Lughod 1989:286).  
 
Whatever their complicity in colonial and neocolonial projects, both Ghosh and Lindholm 
luxuriate in the fissiparous, self-assertive milieu of their informants, emphasizing an underlying 
affinity of values. Little wonder then that anthropologists of the Middle East are so enthusiastic 
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to return to this image of egalitarian segmentarity again and again. Lindholm goes so far as to 
assert this privileging of similarities as a programmatic stance distinguishing his work from 
earlier studies of emotions: “they concentrated their work… on difference, and not on what must 
be retained for man to remain human. My purpose is to redirect attention to this element, to the 
underlying and universal emotions that make us all kin” (Lindholm 1982:xxxi). Ultimately, in 
keeping with the time period, Lindholm’s ethnography is not particularly interested in envy and 
jealousy beyond the ability of these emotions to explain the more pro-social side of Pukhtun life 
and thereby sponsor their inclusion within a larger human family. 
Like Lindholm and Ghosh, who take up Foster so as to transmute his idea of envy into 
something less threatening and more pro-social like generosity and egalitarianism, Pitt-Rivers 
(the third and final latter-day critic of Foster’s model of envy) is also keen to sublimate envy into 
something more relatable: grace. Pitt-Rivers is also concerned with peasant notions of honor 
grounded in segmentary kinship and the defense of (and conflict over) shared patrimony. The 
line between envy and grace is blurry at best for Pitt-Rivers and, indeed, envy emerges in his 
rendering as grace’s dark double. Responding to Foster’s later (1972) assertion that American 
tipping culture (with its emphasis on leaving a substantial “gratuity” for the server) is a 
manifestation of American society’s repressed fear of envy, Pitt-Rivers presents an alternative 
explanation. He grants that there is “substance” to the explanation that tipping arises from “the 
need to assuage the envy which a server might be supposed to feel towards those whom he 
serves, rather as the envy of witches is sometimes bought off by a gesture of gratuity” (Pitt-
Rivers: 2017:80). Yet he proposes that, when freely given, “the tip does no more than underline 
the absence of contractual obligation… and hence the superior social status of the giver” (ibid). 
Putting to the side the question of what the Oxford Don and Berkeley Professor might be 
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revealing about themselves (and their respective views of the lower orders) when they attribute a 
particular rationale of tipping, it is striking how open-ended the interpretation of these sorts of 
social institutions can be. As Pitt-Rivers writes, “an excess of hospitality can humiliate as much 
as insufficiency. For honor looks always up, pity, the poor relation of grace, looks down, but it is 
not always easy to tell which way people are looking” (Pitt-Rivers 2017:81). Again, envy 
emerges from an intersubjective relationship, but it is hard to parse and fix respective roles. 
All of this, nonetheless, is leading directly towards the divine: grace and the Arabic 
baraka are ultimately concerned with the distribution of the divine bounty, in all of its excess. 
All humans are called to participate and, as Pitt-Rivers argues, “the moral obligation is only to 
return grace and what is resented if it is not returned is not the material loss but the rejection of 
the donor’s self” (2017:97). Indeed, when receiving hospitality in Jordan I am often reassured 
that it has nothing at all to do with me—that I should not concern myself with ideas of 
reciprocity. “This is baraka (grace/blessing).” “It’s not for you—it’s for God.” This is a not-
altogether-serious invitation to (and simultaneous refusal of) full sociality offered along with tea, 
coffee, and heaping plates of meat. In contrast, when I wish to refuse such offers of hospitality, I 
am expected to repeat with increasing vociferousness “God bless you too!” (allah yabārak fīk). 
Such a denial of self also represents a particularly elaborate and intense strategy for avoiding 
envy, one which introduces an omnipresent and omnipotent deity as the ultimate prophylactic 
against incipient relations of envy.  
Yet again, however, ethnographic engagements with envy struggle to escape from its 
gravitational pull, often by trying to substitute something that is more pro-social, which might 
help to realize a unified human ecumene. Since Foster, this attempt to transform envy into the 
flip-side of something else (generosity, egalitarianism, and grace) has become increasingly 
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pronounced. Ethnographers here seem to be taking a page from their interlocutors, who also seek 
to transform envy into something else, much like my Jordanian interlocutors with their 
mashallahs and allah yabārak fīks. The slipperiness of the roles in interactions and the 
language’s lack of semantic content (eg. its vulnerability to sarcasm or pandering) both conspire 
to keep envy just at the threshold of consciousness. One might even ask whether envy builds 
worlds, whether many of humanity’s most cherished institutions and practices are semi-
conscious rejections of envy. It is worth investigating. In her excellent analysis of how evil eye 
beliefs in an Egyptian workshop can serve as a critique of emerging neoliberal logics there, Julia 
Elyachar argues that these are far more than mere [verbal] talismans—they are also powerful 
symbols that constitute physical evidence of “positive value production” that can, through 
movement in social space, “produce the same practices that were found in the previous setting” 
(2005: 164-164). In any event, envy is deeply dependent upon the social worlds of those who 
feel it, suspect it, and make accusations about it. If one is truly committed to a universalist 
conception of humanity, then these sorts of petty differences (however petty) cannot be 
dispensed with summarily but rather represent something worth grappling with. 
Conclusion: Envy and the Racecraft of Ethnographic Comparison 
Comparing how envy operates in the discourse of ethnographers and their peasant-
villager interlocutors respectively reveals similarities and divergences in how envy is mobilized 
at a number of scales and levels of abstraction by differently situated social actors. As 
ethnographers have become more self-conscious in recent decades, though, they seem to have 
become as circumspect about making explicit, public accusations of envy as their interlocutors. 
There is an increasing tendency for talk of envy to be recognized as revealing more than it might 
mean to—although such a recognition inherently resists explicit discussion. It manifests itself 
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instead, much like envy in the archetypal village of twentieth century ethnography, through 
denials, ambiguity, and abrupt attempts to invoke something more pro-social. This is not to 
ignore the important divergences, though: whereas envy ‘in the village’ is structured around 
kinship, agricultural wealth, and neighborly conviviality, ethnographic envy is about authorship 
and the more or less consensual interpellation of whole identity categories through the 
institutions of mass culture.  
Karen and Barbara Fields (2014) have explored this homology through the concept of 
racecraft, which they develop through a reading of racism based on the structural-functionalist 
explanation of witchcraft developed by Evans-Pritchard in his work among the Azande. From 
interpersonal microaggressions to the junk science of ‘race science,’ race – like witchcraft – 
“explains unfortunate events” (Evans-Pritchard 1935:18). Like some sort of ideological voltage 
converter, race, racism, and “racecraft” help people structure their accounts of misfortune in 
terms of broader collective struggles over power, prestige and other limited goods by “step[ping] 
down the current of macro-economic inequality to suit the small appliances of everyday life and 
the limited purview of their hard-pressed users” (Fields and Fields 2014:271). In doing so, the 
two show not only how social tensions scale, but also how this scalar dimension is pragmatically 
mobilized by social actors (especially more dominant ones) to maintain and reinforce various 
inequalities. Like Evans-Pritchard and Fields and Fields, I have sought to take something often 
relegated to a psychologized subjective realm (racism and witchcraft; and envy in my case) and 
highlight its social character and implications. A key implication here is that, especially where 
they are asked to take the paranoia and loneliness of those at the top of the social hierarchy at 
face value, ethnographers need to adopt a methodological skepticism towards elite-centric 
narratives of envy.  
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Long after the term “Orientalist” has become pejorative, the popular image of the Middle 
East remains a contradictory mixture of admiration and contempt so typical of invidious 
portrayals. George W. Bush, launching his “War on Terror” in the Middle East, famously 
declared, “They hate our freedoms.” At the same time, the region remains a site of various 
Western fascinations, which this paper has tried to document. For Bush, of course, the region 
was supposed to be a source of unlimited energy resources and hence unlimited wealth that 
might help to perpetuate the seemingly limitless economic growth of the industrial era that was 
then beginning to flag (Mitchell 2013). Today’s image of oil-producing states’ cradle to grave 
social provisioning, which purportedly allows their citizens to lead lives of voluptuous 
dissipation, has a certain continuity with earlier tropes. This is to say nothing of Orientalist 
fantasies of fanatical, single-minded religious conviction and tribal honor, both of which are seen 
to dispense with the ambivalence and indecisiveness of putatively ‘modern’ Western thought. If 
the continuing popularity of desert romances in the post-War on Terror world documented by 
Hsu-Ming Teo (2013) is any indication, there is also a continuing sexual fascination with the 
region, combining hyper-virility with hyper-chastity. This feeds off of older Orientalist tropes of 
honor: “real” masculine men and virginal women. One might be forgiven for asking: who hates 
the freedom of whom here? 
In this context, simply making the Middle East a “prestige zone” for a positively 
valorized concept like hospitality, egalitarianism, or grace would do little to correct for earlier 
tropes if it merely emphasized the admiring dimension of envy while leaving the contemptuous 
dimension implicit. What ethnographers transmit from their interlocutors to wider ethnographic 
debates must serve not as crude theoretical metonyms for typifying geographic regions and 
biological individuals, but rather as supple analytics that can travel amongst continents and 
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bodies, even implicating ethnographers themselves. To return to Strathern, it is not about 
comparing “individual concepts,” but rather finding “ways to compare theories of social action 
themselves” (1990:214). To fulfill such a role, more nuanced notions of envy (including the 
notion of envying down) must be able to illustrate how different, empirically identifiable social 
institutions the world over (from witchcraft, Islam, and the evil eye to hospitality, honor and 
racism) elaborate envy along diverse, distinctly social lines. Such notions can help to challenge 
received notions of economic rationality, personhood, hierarchy, difference, and freedom. 
Perhaps such notions can even serve as an alternative framework to the virulent anger and 
resentment that has arisen in the West towards the so-called East in recent decades and centuries. 
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